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Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend 
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employees and left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of 
the treatment status, we find that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and 
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power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) suffer a drop both in the wage level 
and its growth rate. 
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Since the work of Lazear (1990), it has been well-known that in a perfectly competitive
labour market the cost of employment protection legislation (EPL) is fully shifted onto
lower wages if dismissal costs entail a transfer from ￿rms to risk neutral workers. Wages
are also expected to fall if risk averse workers value job security and are willing to pay for
an increase in EPL (Pissarides, 2001; Bertola, 2004). Potentially o⁄setting the negative
e⁄ect of EPL on wages, job security provisions may strengthen the bargaining position of
workers vis-￿-vis employers, allowing them to reap a larger share of the surplus and obtain
higher wages in markets where individual or collective negotiation takes place (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999; Ljungqvist, 2002). Moreover, stricter EPL may raise ￿rms￿incentives
to invest in training, thereby fostering the accumulation of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital and
increasing both productivity and wages (Autor et al., 2003; Wasmer, 2006; Cingano et al.,
2010).
Thus, theory predicts an ambiguous impact of EPL on wages, with heterogenous e⁄ects
possibly stemming from di⁄erences in the bargaining positions of workers vis-￿-vis employers
(Dolado et al., 2007).
This paper attempts to provide evidence for the e⁄ects of EPL on workers￿individual
wages. The analysis is based on data from Italy, one of the strictest countries in terms of
employment protection legislation. Italy is an interesting country to study for two additional
reasons: First, although in Italy wage determination is to a large extent centralized, an
important component of workers￿compensation is determined at the ￿rm level in the form
of company-level wage increments, production bonuses and other variable bene￿ts (Guiso et
al., 2005).1 Second, the changes in the Italian institutional framework allow us to achieve
a clean identi￿cation, exploiting EPL variation both across ￿rms and over time. In fact,
until 1990 the Italian labour code, enacted in 1970, provided a sharp discontinuity in the
application of EPL at the 15 employee threshold, with no protection for workers in small ￿rms
and high protection for those in large ￿rms. In July 1990, severance payments were increased
from zero to between 2.5 and 6 months of pay for ￿rms with fewer than 15 employees, and
left unchanged for ￿rms with more than 15 employees.
We are therefore able to identify the e⁄ects of employment protection legislation compar-
ing wages of small versus large ￿rms workers before and after the law change in a neighbour-
1In terms of the magnitude of the ￿rm-speci￿c part of the wage, between one sixth and one quarter of
the compensation is ￿rm-speci￿c. In terms of di⁄usion, half of Italian workers were involved in ￿rm-level
negotiations in the period covered by our sample. These estimates, based on data in the metal products,
machinery and equipment industry are reported by CESOS, an association of trade unions. See Erickson
and Ichino (1995) for further details on wage formation in Italy for the period covered by our data.
2hood of the 15 employees threshold, thus combining a regression discontinuity design (RDD)
with a di⁄erence in di⁄erence (DID) approach. Our identi￿cation assumption is essentially
that, after conditioning, the average wages of individuals employed in ￿rms marginally above
the 15 employees threshold (16￿ 25) represents a valid counterfactual for the wages of workers
employed in ￿rms just below the threshold (5￿ 15) both before and after the reform, i.e., we
expect conditional wages in the treated and control groups to diverge after the law change
for no other reason than the reform itself.
One natural concern, in our case, is the endogeneity of the treatment status. On the one
side, it is possible that marginal ￿rms which kept their size just below 15 before the reform
to avoid strict EPL rules, increased their size because of the reform. To control for ￿rms
sorting into the large or small group according to time-invariant characteristics, we estimate
￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects models. Additionally, we instrument the treatment status with ￿rm size in
1989 and 1988, when the reform was not in place and was unexpected. On the other side,
workers may also sort around the 15 employees according to their preferences over the mix
of employment protection and wages. To control for workers sorting into large or small ￿rms
according to ￿xed characteristics, we estimate the model using worker ￿xed e⁄ects.
This paper uses administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS),
and exploits a matched employer￿ employee panel which contains the entire population of
workers and ￿rms located in the Italian provinces of Vicenza and Treviso. Baseline OLS
estimates indicate a signi￿cant wage loss in small relative to large ￿rms after the 1990 reform
that ranges, on average, between 0.5 and 1 percent. The negative e⁄ect is, however, highly
heterogeneous. Movers su⁄er a drop in the wage rate in small relative to large ￿rms after the
reform of about 2 percent, while incumbent workers seem not to be harmed by stricter EPL.
Blue collar in small ￿rms experience a reduction of the wage rate after the reform of about
1.5 percent, whereas white collar are left una⁄ected. Similarly, wages of workers below 45 in
small ￿rms go down by 1 to 2 percent after the reform, while older workers su⁄er no wage
loss. The negative e⁄ect is robust to the inclusion of worker ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects
and appears also when ￿rm size is instrumented, suggesting that the sorting of ￿rms may
not be a big issue.
In order to investigate whether job security provisions a⁄ect not only the level of the wage
but also its growth rate, we look at the e⁄ects of EPL on year-to-year log wage changes.
Results show that small ￿rms workers lose on average 1 percent in terms of wage growth after
the reform relative to large ￿rms workers. The speci￿cation in changes exhibits a similar
pattern as the speci￿cation in levels: even though all groups of workers (except white collar)
seem to be negatively a⁄ected by the reform, the losses are quantitatively stronger among
3movers, young workers and blue collar.
This pattern of results favours the interpretation that the ability of the employers to shift
the cost of EPL onto wages depends on workers￿bargaining power. Firms are better able to
negotiate lower wages with new entrants rather than to renegotiate incumbents wages. At
the same time, it is plausible to think that young and blue collar workers are in a weaker
position within the ￿rm compared to older and white collar workers.
While there is a large literature on the e⁄ects of EPL on job ￿ ows, relative little empirical
evidence is available on the wage e⁄ects of dismissal costs.2 Autor et al. (2007) and Cingano
et al. (2010) study the e⁄ect of EPL on ￿rm-level productivity. Bertola (1990) shows that
in high job security countries wages tend to be lower. More recently, using ￿rm-level data,
Martins (2009) shows that EPL raises wages in Portugal while Bird and Knopf (2009) ￿nd
evidence of a relationship between the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections and the
increase in labor expenses of U.S. commercial banks.
More related to this paper are the studies conducted on individual data which reach
disparate conclusions. Autor et al. (2006) ￿nd no evidence that wrongful-discharge laws had
a signi￿cant impact on wage levels in the U.S.. Cervini PlÆ et al. (2010) analyse the 1997
reform of Spanish severance pay and payroll taxes and conclude that decreased ￿ring costs
and payroll taxes have a positive e⁄ect on wages. Van der Wiel (2010) ￿nds opposite results
for the Netherlands using a reform that a⁄ected di⁄erently high- and low-tenured workers.
Our paper is distinct from the available studies in many respects. First, identi￿cation is
cleanly achieved by means of a Regression Discontinuity Design combined with a Di⁄erence
in Di⁄erence approach. Second, di⁄erently from Martins (2008) and Bird and Knopf (2009)
we look at individual wages rather than average ￿rm wages. Finally, we look at all workers
and not only at displaced workers as Cervini Pl￿ et al. (2010) and we address explicitly the
issue of endogeneity of the treatment status with instrumental variables.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how ￿ring restrictions
evolved in Italy. Section 3 describes the dataset and the sample selection rules. Section
4 explains the identi￿cation strategy used to evaluate the impact of EPL on the wage dis-
tribution. Section 5 presents OLS and IV estimates of the impact of increased strictness
2Previous empirical literature mostly concentrates on the e⁄ects of EPL on employment ￿ ows, often
using the cross-state variation of EPL within the U.S.. Autor (2003) looks at the e⁄ect of EPL on the use of
temporary help agencies. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) consider re-employment probabilities. Some papers
exploit the discontinuities in ￿ring costs regimes that apply to ￿rms of di⁄erent sizes within countries. Boeri
and Jimeno (2005) assess the e⁄ect of EPL on lay-o⁄ probabilities by comparing ￿rms below and above
15 employees in Italy, while Kugler and Pica (2006) examine the joint impact of EPL and product market
regulation on job ￿ ows in Italy using both the ￿rm size threshold and a law change. Using a di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences approach, Bauer et al. (2007) investigate the impact of granting employees the right to claim
unfair dismissal on employment in small German ￿rms.
4of employment protection in small ￿rms in Italy after 1990 on average wages. Section 6
discusses the results and concludes with a back of the envelope calculation of the share of
EPL costs translated into lower wages.
2 Institutional background
The Italian labour code favours open-ended contracts over ￿xed-term or temporary contracts.
As a form of worker protection for open-ended contracts, labour codes specify which causes
are considered justi￿ed causes for dismissal, and establish workers￿compensation depending
on the reason for the termination. In contrast, temporary contracts can be terminated at
no cost provided that the duration of the contract has expired. Labour codes also limit trial
periods￿ that is, the period of time during which a ￿rm can test and dismiss a worker at no
cost (in Italy 3 months) and mandate a minimum advance notice period prior to termination
(1 month).
Over the years the Italian legislation ruling unfair dismissals has changed several times.
Both the magnitude of the ￿ring cost and the coverage of the ￿rms subject to the restrictions
have gone through extensive changes. Individual dismissals were ￿rst regulated in Italy in
1966 through Law 604, which established that employers could freely dismiss workers either
for economic reasons (considered as fair ￿objective￿motives) or in case of misconduct (con-
sidered as fair ￿subjective￿motives). However, in these cases workers could take employers
to court and judges would determine if the dismissals were indeed fair or unfair. In case of
unfair dismissal, employers had the choice to either reinstate the worker or pay severance,
which depended on tenure and ￿rm size. Severance pay for unfair dismissals ranged between
5 and 8 months for workers with less than two and a half years of tenure, between 5 and
12 months for those between two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and between 5 and 14
months for workers with more than 20 years of tenure in ￿rms with more than 60 employees.
Firms with fewer than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid by ￿rms with more
than 60 employees, and ￿rms with fewer than 35 workers were completely exempt.
In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law 300) established that all ￿rms with more than 15
employees had to reinstate workers and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals.
Firms with fewer than 15 employees remained exempt. The law prescribes that the 15
employees threshold should refer to establishments rather than to ￿rms. In the data we only
have information at the ￿rm level. However, this is not likely to be a concern as in the
empirical analysis we focus on ￿rms between 5 and 25 employees that are plausibly single-
plant ￿rms. Although severance pay in case of dismissal is due only to permanent workers,
5the labour code computes the 15 employees threshold in terms of full-time equivalents rather
than in terms of heads in order to avoid ￿rms bypassing EPL regulations by hiring workers
under ￿xed-term contracts.
Finally, Law 108 was introduced in July 1990 restricting dismissals for permanent con-
tracts. This law introduced severance payments of between 2.5 and 6 months pay for unfair
dismissals in ￿rms with fewer than 15 employees. Firms with more than 15 employees still
had to reinstate workers and pay foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals. This means
that the cost of unfair dismissals for ￿rms with fewer than 15 employees increased relative
to the cost for ￿rms with more than 15 employees after 1990.3 For our purposes, this reform
has two attractive features. First, it was largely unexpected: the ￿rst published news of
the intention to change the EPL rules for small ￿rms appeared in the main Italian ￿nancial
newspaper￿ Il Sole 24 Ore￿ at the end of January 1990. Second, it imposed substantial
costs on small ￿rms. Kugler and Pica (2008) look at the e⁄ect of this reform on job and
workers ￿ ows and ￿nd that accessions and separations decreased by about 13% and 15% in
small relative to large ￿rms after the reform.
3 Data description
This paper uses the VWH data set which is an employer￿ employee panel with information on
the characteristics of both workers and ￿rms. The longitudinal panel is constructed from the
administrative records of the Italian Social Security System (INPS). It refers to the entire
population of employers and workers of the private sector in two provinces, Treviso and
Vicenza, of the Italian region of Veneto. The two provinces are located in the north-eastern
part of the country. In the year 2000, GDP per capita was 22,400 euros, 20% higher than
the national average and accounted for 3.3% of the Italian GDP. The overall population
was 1.6 million people (2.7% of the total Italian population) as of the 2001 Population
Census.4 Although limited to two relatively small provinces, the data are well suited for
3A further reform was passed in 1991 concerning collective dismissals. A special procedure was introduced
for ￿rms with more than 15 employees willing to dismiss ￿ve or more workers within 120 days because of
plant closure or restructuring. According to this procedure, ￿rms were required to engage in negotiations
with unions and government to reach an agreement on the dismissals. However, if public administration
o¢ cials determine that an agreement cannot be reached, the ￿rm is free to downsize and the employees are
not allowed to take the ￿rm to court. Kugler and Pica (2008) empirically distinguish the 1990 and the 1991
reforms and ￿nd no additional signi￿cant e⁄ect of the 1991 reform on workers and job ￿ ows. Hence, this
reform is unlikely to cloud our results. Paggiaro, Rettore and Trivellato (2008) also examine aspects of the
1991 law concerning active labour market policies and ￿nd limited e⁄ects only on workers aged 50+.
4The average establishment size in Veneto is 13 employees. Half of the employment stock is not subject to
protection against dismissal as stated by art. 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori. For a decade Veneto has been
also a full employment region with a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing, compared to a negative
6studying the e⁄ect of the 1990 EPL reform because the Italian north-east is characterized by
a high concentration of small ￿rms and a tight labour market. Moreover, the availability of
information on the universe of workers and ￿rms allows of building suitable instruments for
￿rm size and of applying IV techniques.5 The use of a random sample of the Italian working
population would only allow OLS estimates (available upon request).
The data include universal information on all plants and employees working at least one
day in any plant of the two provinces from 1984 to 1997. The data include information on
employees￿age, gender, occupation (blue collar/white collar), yearly wage, number of paid
weeks, type of contract (permanent/temporary), and information on ￿rms￿location, sector
of employment, average number of employees and date of closure. Unfortunately, we have
no information on education. The unit of observation is the employer-day; such information
is used to build a complete history of the working life of each employee. Once they are in
the dataset, employees are followed, independently of their place of residence, even in their
occupational spells out of Treviso and Vicenza.
The only reason of dropping out of the dataset is exit from the private sector or from
employment status altogether. Since the individual longitudinal records are generated using
social security numbers and collect information on private sector employees for the purpose of
computing retirement bene￿ts, employees are only followed through their employment spells.
The data stop following individuals who move into self-employment, the public sector, the
agricultural sector, the underground economy, unemployment, or retirement.
We select all males of ages between 20 and 55 hired on a permanent basis. We exclude
females because in their case the trade-o⁄ between job security and wages is likely to be
a⁄ected by fertility decisions on which we have no information. We also exclude temporary
workers because employment protection provisions are guaranteed only to workers on a
permanent contract.6
national rate and positive migration ￿ ows. Typical manufacturing activities are garments, mechanical goods,
goldsmiths, leather, textile, furniture and plastics. The stock of manufacturing workers in the two Veneto
provinces of Treviso and Vicenza has varied between 194,000 employees in the early 1980s and 233,000
employees in 1996, with a yearly positive average rate of variation of 1.4%. The average rate of growth in
employment is the result of a marked increase in white collar and women (see Tattara and Valentini, 2005).
5Card et al. (2010) investigate the evidence on rent-sharing and holdup on the same data.
6A further concern is that ￿rms can bypass the EPL regulation based on the 15 employees threshold hiring
workers on a ￿xed term contract. The de￿nition of the threshold is based on full-time equivalents rather
than on heads and therefore leaves little room for ￿rms to circumvent the rule. In particular, the labour
code excludes apprentices and temporary workers below nine months, and includes part-time workers and
all other temporary contracts in proportion to their actual time. Our dataset records the type of contract
(full-time, part-time, apprentices and temporary workers) but does not contain information on the number
of hours worked. For this reason, in our estimates the threshold is calculated on the basis of full-time workers
on permanent contracts.
7We focus on 1989￿ 1993 and remove 1990 because the reform occurred in the month of
July and the wages of 1990 are likely to be a mixture of pre-reform and post-reform wages.
To preserve the comparability of treatment and control groups, we further select the sample
to ￿rms within the interval 5￿ 25 employees. In the course of the paper we use weekly wages
after eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the wage distribution in each year. In case the
same individual has multiple employment spells in di⁄erent ￿rms in the same year we keep
the longest spell. The ￿nal sample is of 9,914 ￿rms and 29,177 workers.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.
The number of small ￿rms (5￿ 15) is higher than the number of large ￿rms (16￿ 25), so is
the number of workers working in small ￿rms, both before and after the reform. The real
weekly wage of workers in large ￿rms is around 312 (331) euros per week before (after) the
reform vs. a signi￿cantly lower wage of 297 (312) euros per week in small ￿rms before (after)
the reform. The year-to-year average wage change is however similar in the two groups in
the range of 4-5% per year before the reform and 2.4-2.9% after the reform. The average
age of workers is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across the two groups while larger ￿rms employ
a slightly higher proportion of white collar workers.
4 Identi￿cation strategy
The estimand of interest is the average treatment e⁄ect of EPL on wages. The conditional
comparison of wages in small and big ￿rms does not generally provide an unbiassed estimate
of the average treatment e⁄ect, because ￿rms with di⁄erent unobservable characteristics
may endogenously choose their size and their wages. The fact that in Italy the level of EPL
depends on ￿rm size, coupled with the reform of EPL which a⁄ected only small ￿rms, can
be exploited to build an RDD combined with a DID strategy to estimate the causal e⁄ect of
EPL on wages.
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs on wages, we compare the change in
mean wages paid by ￿rms just below 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform to the
change in mean wages paid by ￿rms just above 15 employees. In other words, the assumption
that guarantees that the e⁄ect of EPL on wages can be interpreted as causal is that the
characteristics of workers and ￿rms should not display any discontinuity at the threshold.
Another identi￿cation assumption is that the average wage of individuals employed in ￿rms
marginally below the 15 employees threshold (5￿ 15) is expected to diverge from the wage
of the control group employed in ￿rms just above the threshold (16￿ 25) for no other reason
than the law change.
8If workers and ￿rms were exogenously assigned to the treatment and control groups, OLS
















jt) + eijt (1)
D
S
jt = 1[￿rm size ￿ 15 in year t]
Post = 1[year ￿ 1991]
The dependent variable is the log of the weekly wage paid to worker i by ￿rm j in year t (or
the ￿rst di⁄erence of log wages in the speci￿cation in changes, see Table 6) and is given by
the yearly wage divided by the number of paid weeks.
The variable Post is a dummy that takes the value of 1 starting from 1991 and zero
otherwise; DS
jt is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed in year t in a
￿rm with fewer than 15 employees and 0 if the worker is employed in a ￿rm with strictly more
than 15 employees. The interaction term DS
jt￿Post between the small ￿rm dummy and the
post-reform dummy is included to capture the e⁄ect of the EPL reform. All speci￿cations
contain a polynomial of third degree in ￿rm size.7 The matrix Xijt includes age dummies,
an occupation (white collar/blue collar) dummy, nine industry dummies and year dummies
which account for macro shocks and predate the main e⁄ect of the post-reform dummy. The
reported standard errors account for possible error correlations at the individual level.
Equation (1) gives unbiassed estimates only if workers and ￿rms are exogenously assigned
to the treatment status. However, individuals may decide to work in small or large ￿rms, and
￿rms in turn may decide to grow above or shrink below the 15 employees threshold. Thus,
a fundamental concern of this paper is the non-random selection of workers and ￿rms above
and below the ￿fteen employees threshold. To control for the sorting of workers into large
or small ￿rms according to time-invariant workers characteristics, we estimate the model
using worker ￿xed e⁄ects. In the same way, to control for the sorting of ￿rms into the large
or small group, we estimate a model that includes ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects and, in an alternative
speci￿cation, we use an instrumental variable approach to which we now turn.
4.1 Firm sorting: the instrumental variable model
Identi￿cation in (1) is threatened by the possibility that ￿rms sort around the 15 employees
threshold. Regressions using ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects control for all time-invariant unobserved fac-
tors that may a⁄ect the propensity of ￿rms to self-select into (or out of) treatment. However,
7Results are robust to this functional form assumption. Alternatively, a split polinomial approximation
(as in Lee, 2008) or a local linear regression can be used in RDD regressions. See Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
for an overview of di⁄erent alternatives.
9they do not account for the selection due to the reform itself. Firms in the neighbourhood
of the 15 employees￿threshold may change their size in response to the 1990 reform of EPL,
thus biassing the estimates. For example, ￿rms which kept their size just below 15 before
the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, may have increased their size because the reform made
the gap in EPL provisions narrower. The sign of the bias due to ￿rms￿sorting is not easy
to establish. If ￿rms which were keeping their size below 15 before the reform for fear of
incurring a much higher EPL were those with bad growth perspectives and lower wages,
then presumably OLS estimates understate the e⁄ect of the reform on wages. But it may
also be the case that the ￿rms which were keeping under the threshold were instead those
which were paying higher wages.
In this section, we assess the validity of the identi￿cation strategy discussed in Section 4
with two di⁄erent testing procedures. First, to formally check for the absence of manipulation
of the running variable at 15 (violated if ￿rms were able to alter their size and sort above
or below the threshold), we test the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of ￿rm size
at 15 as proposed by McCrary (2008). Second, we regress the probability of ￿rm growth on
pre-existing ￿rm characteristics.
In Figure 1, we plot the frequency of ￿rms with less than 25 employees, using di⁄erent
bin sizes (0.5 and 1) for 1989 (before the reform) and for 1991 (after the reform). Visual
inspection does not reveal any clear discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold.8 In the
right panel of the same ￿gure, we zoom in on the shape of the running variable around the
15 employees threshold. There, no evidence of manipulative sorting can be detected. We
formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity at this threshold with a McCrary test
by running kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of
the threshold (McCrary, 2008). As we can see from the ￿gure, the log-di⁄erence between the
frequency to the right and to the left of the threshold is not statistically signi￿cant. In fact,
the point estimate is -0.007 (with a standard error of 0.236). However, density tests have
low power if manipulation has occurred on both sides of the threshold. In that case, there
might be non-random sorting not detectable in the distribution of the running variable.
For this reason we perform a further test. Firms may sort around the threshold according
to both observable and unobservable characteristics. To verify if sorting happens according
to pre-existing unobservable characteristics, we ￿rst estimate a regression of ￿rms￿average
wages paid in 1986￿ 1989 (before the reform) on ￿rm size, ￿rm age, year dummies and ￿rm
8The average ￿rm size in Italy is approximately half that of the European Union and expensive EPL
for ￿rms larger than 15 is often wrongly indicated as one of the factors responsible for such a skewed size
distribution. The non-existence of lumps at 15 can be explained by the fact that ￿rms choose their size on
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Figure 1: Frequency of ￿rm size and McCrary test of density continuity. Weighted kernel
estimation of the log density, performed separately on either side of the threshold. Optimal
binwidth and binsize as in McCrary (2008).
11￿xed e⁄ects. We then use the time-invariant portion of the residual as one of the determinants
of the ￿rm probability of growing. The probit regression is of the form
djt = ￿
0
Xjt + ￿0Post + ￿1dummySjt￿1 + ￿2FEj + ￿0 (dummySjt￿1 ￿ Post) (2)
+￿1 (FEj ￿ Post) + ￿2 (dummySjt￿1 ￿ Post ￿ FEj) + "jt;
where djt = 1 if ￿rm j in year t has a larger size than in t￿1: The term dummySjt￿1 denotes
a set of ￿rm size dummies while the variable Post takes the value of one from 1991. The
term FEj denotes the estimated ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. The matrix Xjt includes a quadratic in
￿rms￿age, year dummies, sector dummies and a polynomial in lagged ￿rm size.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that on average ￿rms just below 15 employees are about 3%
less likely to grow of one unit than larger ￿rms. These results are consistent with Schivardi
and Torrini (2008) and Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2004) who ￿nd that more stringent
job security provisions hamper ￿rm growth. They ￿nd that the discontinuous change in EPL
at the 15 employees threshold reduces by 2% the probability that ￿rms pass the threshold.
Column 2 shows that the e⁄ect is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent before and after the reform
(insigni￿cant coe¢ cient on Post 1990 ￿ Dummy 15). Finally, column 3 indicates that the
e⁄ect is similar for ￿rms with di⁄erent average pre-reform wages, as the coe¢ cient of the
triple interaction Post 1990 ￿ Firms Fixed E⁄ect ￿ Dummy 15 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero.
While the fact that there is little evidence of ￿rm sorting is reassuring, we also show
results adopting an IV strategy to address the further concern that residual unobserved
heterogeneity may drive ￿rms￿sorting behaviour. As an instrument for the treatment status
(the ￿rm size dummy), we use ￿rm size in 1989 and in 1988. These instruments are not




































jpre is a vector that includes ￿rm size in 1989 and in 1988. The term DS
jt ￿ Post is
also instrumented using as an instrument SS
jpre ￿ Post. The matrix Xijt contains the same
controls as in equation (1).
124.2 Worker sorting
Identi￿cation in (1) may be threatened also by workers non-randomly sorting around the 15
employees threshold. The idea is that workers (particularly job-to-job movers) may be able
to choose their own EPL regime by selecting the size of the ￿rm they work for. This may bias
our results as long this selection process is driven by worker characteristics that we are not
able to control for. Suppose, for example, that low-productivity workers disproportionately
apply to (and are subsequently hired in) more protected jobs. In this case, a negative
association between wages and job protection cannot be interpreted as the causal e⁄ect
of EPL on wages, as it rather re￿ ects the di⁄erent composition of the pool of workers in
protected and non protected jobs.
Including worker ￿xed e⁄ects into (1) helps address this concern to the extent that it
allows of controlling for all time-invariant unobservable worker attributes that a⁄ect the
choice of the workers regarding their EPL regime. Of course, worker ￿xed e⁄ects do not
allow of controlling for the time-varying factors that a⁄ect worker self-selection, including
the reform itself.
It is therefore desirable to test whether workers non-randomly sort into ￿rms above and
below the 15 employees threshold. We do so adopting two strategies. First, we check whether
￿rms observable characteristics, such as industry, age, and occupation (white collar/blue col-
lar) composition of the workforce, are balanced in the neighbourhood of the 15 employees
threshold. If non-random workers sorting were to occur, we would expect these character-
istics to di⁄er systematically between treated and untreated ￿rms around the 15 employees
threshold. The balance tests are performed running the ￿rm-level regression:













jt) + ejt: (4)
Notice that this test gives also insights on whether other (unobserved) policies di⁄erentially
a⁄ect small and large ￿rms since 1990. Indeed, our empirical strategy may be hampered
by the presence of unobserved factors (for example another policy change) that are also
discontinuous at the threshold exactly at the time of the reform, thus confounding the e⁄ect
of the reform itself. Although we cannot directly test this assumption, we can investigate
whether ￿rms observable characteristics have discontinuities at the threshold after 1990.
Table 3 shows the coe¢ cients and standard errors of ￿2: No pre-treatment characteristics
show a signi￿cant discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold after the reform in the 3nd
degree polynomial speci￿cation. In particular, the age, occupation, and industry composition
of ￿rms across the two sides of the threshold is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent after the reform.
13The only weakly signi￿cant coe¢ cients belong to three industry dummies in the case of the
2rd degree polynomial speci￿cation. These results are also suggestive that the e⁄ect of the
change in EPL is unlikely to be confounded with the e⁄ect of another policy that depends
on ￿rm size and shares the same threshold.
We further test for non-random selection of workers by explicitly looking at their ￿ ows
across ￿rms. If the reform lowers the wage in small ￿rms relative to big ￿rms after the
reform, one may expect larger ￿ ows of workers from small to big ￿rms and smaller ￿ ows
from big to small ￿rms after the reform. In order to assess the extent of worker sorting we
run regressions of the probability of workers moving to a big ￿rm or to a small ￿rm on a
number of determinants that include a small ￿rm dummy interacted with year dummies.




















0t equals 1 if in year t worker i moves from ￿rm j to a ￿rm j
0 with more than 15
employees (Table 4, columns 1 and 2) or to a ￿rm j
0 with fewer than 15 employees (Table
4, columns 3 and 4). The dummy DS
jt￿1 indicates the size of the ￿rm of origin and it equals
1 if the ￿rm has fewer than 15 employees. The term Tt denotes a set of year dummies. The
variable FEi (indicated as Workers Fixed E⁄ect in Table 4) is the time-invariant component
of the individual￿ s average pre-reform wage (between 1986 and 1989) purged of age, a third
degree polynomial in ￿rm size and year dummies. The matrix Xijt includes a quadratic in
worker age, sector dummies and a polynomial in the size of the ￿rm of origin.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that there is a lower probability of moving to ￿rms larger
than 15 coming from a small ￿rm after the reform, i.e. in 1990, 1991 and 1992 (negative and
signi￿cant coe¢ cients on T1990￿DS
jt￿1, T1991￿DS
jt￿1 and T1992￿DS
jt￿1). However, column 2 of
Table 4 shows that the drop in the probability of moving from a small to a large ￿rm is smaller
for high-wage workers in 1991 (positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on T1991 ￿ DS
jt￿1 ￿ FEi),
while it is independent of (the time-invariant component of) workers wages in 1990 and 1992
(insigni￿cant coe¢ cients on T1990 ￿DS
jt￿1 ￿FEi and T1992 ￿DS
jt￿1 ￿FEi). Thus, except for
1991, the probability of moving from a small to a large ￿rm after the reform is apparently not
driven by workers￿attributes correlated with their productivity. Results for the probability
of moving from small to small ￿rms (columns 3 and 4) indicate that there are no di⁄erential
e⁄ects around 1990 (insigni￿cant coe¢ cients on both T1990￿DS
jt￿1 and T1990￿DS
jt￿1￿FEi).
Even though Tables 3 and 4 suggest that non-random sorting of workers around the 15
employees threshold should not be a major issue, for robustness purposes the next section
14will show results from workers￿￿xed e⁄ects regressions that control for any time-invariant
worker attributes that may a⁄ect their behaviour.
5 Results
Theory delivers ambiguous predictions on the wage e⁄ects of EPL as workers are subject to
two o⁄setting forces: on the one hand according to the Coasean￿ Lazear model we should
expect EPL to lower wages as ￿rms try and translate part of their cost increase onto workers.
On the other hand insider￿ outsider theories suggest that EPL strengthens workers￿bargain-
ing position and possibly leads to an increase in wages. This is why in what follows we
cut our sample into high- (stayers, white collar, old) and low-bargaining power subsamples
(movers, blue collar, young).
Before turning to the estimates, let us provide a visual summary of the relationship
between EPL and wages. Figure 2 draws a scatter plot of the di⁄erence between post-reform
and pre-reform log wages against ￿rm size in 1989. Each point is the average log wage
di⁄erence within ￿rms of the same size.9 The ￿gure also reports the ￿tted values of a third
degree polynomial regression of the average log wage di⁄erences with respect to ￿rm size in
1989. As ￿rm size is taken to be that of 1989 to minimize endogeneity issues, the picture can
be thought of as representing the reduced form of the IV speci￿cation. The ￿gure shows a
positive jump in the di⁄erence between post- and pre-reform log wages at the 15 employees
threshold, meaning that in the neighbourhood of the threshold wages in small ￿rms decrease
after 1990 relative to wages in large ￿rms. This is consistent with the interpretation that
small ￿rms translate part of the increased cost of EPL into lower wages. The general patterns
presented in the ￿gure are also borne out in the regression results to which we now turn.
Table 5 reports regression results from the estimation of (1). Panel A focusses on the full
sample which includes all workers with a valid wage between 1989 and 1993. The sample is
otherwise unrestricted and is therefore unbalanced. We then move to the subsample of ￿rm
movers (Panel B), i.e., the sample of individuals with a valid wage between 1989 and 1993
who change ￿rm at least once. Next, we consider the sample of stayers (Panel C), i.e., the
sample of all individuals with a valid wage between 1989 and 1993 who stay in the same ￿rm
for the whole period. Of course, the full sample is the sum of the ￿rm stayers and the ￿rm
movers samples. We ￿nally report separate estimates for blue collar workers (Panel D), white
collar workers (Panel E), young workers below 30 (Panel F), and old workers above 45 (Panel
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Figure 2: The solid line is a ￿tted regression of the variable on the vertical axis on a 3rd
degree polynomial in ￿rm size in 1989, performed separately on either side of the threshold.
The dots are the observed log wage di⁄erences averaged in intervals of 0.1 ￿rm size in 1989.
Log wage (post) is the average individual wage in 1991, 1992 and 1993, log wage (pre) is the
average in 1988 and 1989.
16G). For the sake of brevity we only show the coe¢ cient of interest on the interaction term
between the small ￿rm dummy and the post-reform dummy, which measures the average
increase in log wages in small ￿rms after the reform.
OLS results for the full sample (Column 1, Panel A) suggest that workers in ￿rms just
below the ￿rm size threshold of 15 employees are paid 1.1 percent less than workers in ￿rms
immediately above the cuto⁄ after 1990. Columns 2 and 3 refer to worker and ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects estimates, respectively, and show that the negative OLS result is robust (albeit lower
in magnitude) to the inclusion of worker ￿xed e⁄ects but does not survive the inclusion of
￿rm-speci￿c dummies. This may be due to the heterogeneity of the e⁄ects across di⁄erent
workers within the same ￿rm, as the within-￿rm variation (that identi￿es the ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects coe¢ cients) derives from the aggregation of potentially highly heterogeneous and o⁄-
setting worker e⁄ects. Finally, columns 4 and 5 refer to IV and IV with worker ￿xed e⁄ects
estimates, respectively. Both speci￿cations deliver negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients of
approximately the same magnitude as the OLS results.10 This is reassuring as it con￿rms
the impression that ￿rm sorting is not a major source of bias.
Panels B and C of Table 5 look at movers and stayers separately and indicate that the
results obtained for the full sample are mainly driven by the former. Results for the sample
of stayers in Panel C show in fact low and insigni￿cant e⁄ects once we control for worker and
￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. These results ￿t the interpretation that the strength of the wage e⁄ects
of EPL is inversely related to the bargaining power of workers, as newly hired workers are
often endowed with low bargaining power and ￿rms can more easily lower their wages than
those of incumbent workers.
In Panels D and E of Table 5 we analyse the subsamples of blue collar and white collar,
respectively. Results show that the e⁄ect found on the total sample is driven by blue collar
workers: the coe¢ cients in Panel D are of the same magnitude as those shown in Panel A,
while the results for white collar are smaller in magnitude and insigni￿cant. We also ￿nd
that the e⁄ects of EPL on wages are stronger among young workers aged less than 30 (Panel
F) and insigni￿cant among old workers aged more than 45 (Panel G). The negative e⁄ect on
young workers￿wages is almost twice as large as the e⁄ect found on the full sample in the
OLS and the IV speci￿cation (columns 1 and 4) and even larger in the other cases (columns
2, 3 and 5). These results are again in line with a bargaining power type of interpretation,
as blue collar and young workers have arguably low bargaining power vis-￿-vis employers.
Of course, the strength of bargaining power does not refer necessarily to unionization rates
10The power of the instruments is strong as indicated by the F-test of the excluded instruments, equal to
8.04 and 40727.76.
17(which are very low among small ￿rms workers in Veneto, as in the whole country, while
coverage is very high) but to the option value of workers in the market.
Finally, we look at e⁄ects of the EPL reform on log wage changes to investigate whether
stricter EPL a⁄ects wage growth on top of levels. Results in Table 6 show that indeed
this is the case. Full sample estimates in Panel A show that workers lose on average 1%
in terms of wage growth after the reform in small ￿rms relative to large ￿rms. The e⁄ect
is negative and signi￿cant in all speci￿cations (worker ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects and
IVs). It is worth noticing that the fact that the speci￿cation in changes yields a negative
and signi￿cant coe¢ cient even including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (and the coe¢ cient of interest
is identi￿ed by within ￿rm variation) seems to indicate that the negative e⁄ects on wage
growth are more evenly spread across di⁄erent workers types, contrary to the case of wage
levels.
This impression is con￿rmed in the analysis of the di⁄erent subsamples. Both movers
(Panel B) and stayers (Panel C) in small ￿rms su⁄er signi￿cant wage losses after the reform
relative to large ￿rms workers. While the negative e⁄ect on movers is larger in magnitude,
the fact that also stayers are hit by the reform suggests that they also pay part of the increase
in EPL in the form of lower wage growth (or, given that these workers stay in the same ￿rm,
in the form of a lower tenure pro￿le). As long as a large part of the wage is decided at the
￿rm level, incumbents have higher bargaining power and can impede renegotiation of wages
to the bottom but probably cannot avoid a slower wage growth for the part not included
in union contracts. Consistently with this story, blue collar (Panel D) and young workers
(Panel F) lose more in terms of percentage wage changes than white collar (Panel E) and
older workers (Panel G).
5.1 Contractual minimum wages and quantile regression
Similarly to many other European countries, Italy has a system of sectoral minimum wages
bargained at the national level (every 2 years, with exceptions) which extends also to non-
signatory workers. In this section we exploit information on the sectoral minimum wage to
construct a measure of the ￿wage drift￿ , i.e. the di⁄erence between the actual wage and the
sectoral minimum. Thus, the wage drift is yijt = wijt ￿ wmin
jt .where wmin
jt is the contractual
minimum in sector j.11 The average wage premium is 247 Euros per week or in percentage
terms the average premium is 40%. The average wage drift di⁄ers by sector and goes from
11We have information on minimum wages for about 52% of the observations present in the estimation
sample. The di⁄erence is due to missing contract information for ￿rms in the chemical industry and in
industries covered by narrow sectoral agreements. The distribution of the characteristics of the workers (age,
gender, and wages) in the resulting subsample is similar to the distribution in the overall estimation sample.
1829% in the insurance sector to 45% of employees of law ￿rms.12
The wage drift can be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power of the workers:
the higher is the actual compensation with respect to the contractual minimum the higher
is the bargaining power of the workers (Card et al., 2010). Following this reasoning ￿
and consistently with the previous results ￿ we should expect larger wage cuts for low-
bargaining power workers with small wage premia over the minimum. Of course, wages
at (or very close to) the minimum should be insensitive to changes in EPL because of
the binding legal ￿ oor. To investigate these hypotheses we run a quantile regression at
di⁄erent points of the distribution using as a dependent variable the log of the wage drift
logyijt = log(wijt ￿ wminjt). Let Q￿(logyijtjXijt) for ￿ 2 (0;1) denote the ￿
th quantile of
the distribution of logyijt conditional on individual and ￿rm characteristics included in the

















Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained from individual resampling.
Table 7 reports the estimates of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term ￿2￿ obtained at
the 5th, 10th, 50th and 90th quantile. Results show that the negative e⁄ect of the reform
on the wages of small ￿rm workers is stronger at the bottom of the wage drift distribution
and weaker at the top. Panel A shows results for the full sample of workers for whom we
have information on the contract in the benchmark period 1989-1993. While the coe¢ cient
of interest is negative and signi￿cant at all percentiles, the e⁄ect at the 5th percentile of
the wage drift distribution is more than four times larger than the e⁄ect at the top of the
distribution (and than the average e⁄ect obtained in Table 5 on all workers). Panel B on
blue collar workers con￿rms this pattern.
These results are in accordance with the interpretation that ￿rms were able to translate
the increased EPL costs onto workers with low bargaining power. The fact that we ￿nd a
strong e⁄ect also on wages very close to the minimum (the 5th percentile of the wage drift) is
explained by the fact that even at the 5th percentile there is still a 31% premium on average,
12Collective contracts do not correspond exactly to sectors but vary according to ￿rm size and type of
￿rm. We have information on 27 types of contracts: employees of manufacturing ￿rms, small and medium
size manufacturing ￿rms, artisan ￿rms in the manufacturing sector, food manufacturing, insurance ￿rms,
shoemaking ￿rms, paper products, retail industry, employees of cooperative ￿rms in the retail industry,
leather products, construction ￿rms, small construction ￿rms, cooperative construction ￿rms, construction
artisans, toys and personal products, wooden products, artisan wooden products, equipment instalment
￿rms, equipment instalment state-owned ￿rms, equipment instalment small ￿rms, equipment instalment
artisan ￿rms, metal products small ￿rms, cleaning services, cleaning services small ￿rms, transport ￿rms,
professional ￿rms, textiles products, tourism.
19or 140 euro per week over the minimum, i.e. wage minima are hardly binding in this sample.
5.2 Robustness checks and placebo tests
This section shows that our results are robust to a number of checks. In Table 8 we implement
placebo tests by estimating the treatment e⁄ect at fake thresholds, where there should be
no e⁄ect. In particular, we look at ￿rms below and above the fake 10 employees threshold
and we estimate the treatment e⁄ect before and after 1993 and before and after 1988. The
results are reassuring in that the coe¢ cients of the treated group are always insigni￿cant.
In Table 9 we run robustness checks with respect to the time span of the sample￿
enlarging the sample from the benchmark 1989￿ 1993 to 1988￿ 1993, 1987￿ 1994 and 1986￿
1996￿ and with respect to the window of ￿rm size￿ from the benchmark 5￿ 25 to 5￿ 20, 10￿ 20
and 10￿ 25. Both panels show that our results are robust to changes in the sample.
In Table 10 we also show that the results are robust to a di⁄erent speci￿cation. To test
the robustness of the estimates to the polynomial speci￿cation we also ￿t a linear regression










+ "ijt for ￿rm size 2 [15 ￿ ￿;15 + ￿] (7)
where Xijt contains the same controls as in equation (1). We choose ￿ with the cross-
validation method of Imbens and Lemieux (2008). The cross-validation method consists in
choosing ￿ so as to minimize the loss function: L(￿) = 1
N
PN
i=1(logwi ￿ [ logw￿(fsizej))2
where, for every fsizej to the left (right) of the threshold 15, we predict [ logw￿(fsizej) as
if it were at the boundary of the estimation using only observations in the interval fsizej 2
[15 ￿ ￿;15 + ￿]. We choose the optimal ￿ between 1 and 15. The optimal ￿￿ = 10
with L(10) = 0:03762235. Table 10 shows that the results are robust to the speci￿cation
change: the local linear regression estimator yields a negative signi￿cant coe¢ cient for OLS
and weaker but still negative signi￿cant results for workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed e⁄ects and IVs.
Panel B of Table 10 tests successfully the results with samples taken over di⁄erent years.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the e⁄ect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on wages, a
largely underexplored issue in the wide literature on EPL. It exploited, as a natural experi-
ment, a reform of EPL in Italy which increased severance payments after 1990 for ￿rms with
fewer than 15 employees relative to larger ￿rms.
20We ￿nd that average wages of male workers declined by around 0.7%￿ 1.5% in ￿rms
below 15 employees, relative to larger ￿rms, because of the 1990 EPL reform. Our result are
consistent with an explanation based on bargaining power because the e⁄ect is concentrated
on new hires (rather than stayers), on blue collar and on young workers, all groups with a
relatively low bargaining power. Stayers su⁄ered a moderate reduction of wage growth after
the reform. We showed that our results are robust to many changes in the sample time span
and in the window of ￿rm size considered around the 15 employees threshold. Placebo tests
con￿rmed that the results apply only in 1990 for ￿rms at the 15 employees threshold and
not in other cases.
It is important to stress that our empirical exercise￿ which is local in nature as any
RDD￿ cannot help determining whether any increase in EPL would be o⁄set by lower wages.
However, the Italian case o⁄ers not only a clean natural experiment which involved a vast
quantity of ￿rms and workers, but may also provide insights on the e⁄ects of EPL in the
many countries which have ￿rm-level thresholds in the application of EPL.
Using our estimates, it is possible to calculate how much of the increase in the ￿ring
cost is translated onto lower wages.13 We start by considering the situation of a employer-
initiated dismissal of a worker of average tenure in a small ￿rm after the reform. If the
dismissal is ruled unfair by the judge, the ￿ring cost will range between 2.5 and 6 months
(on average 16 weeks) of the last wage. On the basis of our data, the post-reform average
weekly wage amounts to approximately 313 euros. Therefore, the severance pay transferred
to the worker amounts to 313 ￿ 16 weeks = 5,008 euros, excluding the legal expenses that
can be roughly calculated to be as much as 5,000 euros. The above computation results in
a very high ￿ring cost, but we should keep in mind that this is the worst possible scenario
for the ￿rm. Ex-ante, the ￿rm does not know with certainty whether the separation will
be ruled unfair by the court. Furthermore, ￿rms and workers may ￿nd a settlement out
of court. Gald￿n-SÆnchez and G￿ell (2000), using data based on actual court sentences,
estimate that in Italy the probability of reaching an out-of-court agreement to be around
0:5 and the probability that the dismissal is ruled unfair to be about 0:5. If we assume that
in case of an out-of-court agreement the employer pays approximately the same sum that
would be paid in the form of severance pay, ￿rms below 15 employees can expect a ￿ring
cost equal to 5,008 ￿ 0:5 = 2,504 euros excluding legal expenses. If we assume a probability
of 10% of the occurrence of individual ￿ring for economic reasons, the total expected cost
ex-ante is (5,000 + 2,504)=10 = 750:4 euros.
13This quanti￿cation exercise is, as our empirical approach, purely partial equilibrium and assumes any
additional e⁄ects of EPL away. We leave the quanti￿cation of the general equilibrium impact of EPL within
a dynamic GE model for future work.
21Heckman and PagŁs (2004) develop a measure of the expected present discounted cost to
the ￿rm, at the time a worker is hired, associated with severance payments to that worker in
the future (they also take into account notice period, which is not of interest here). Adopting
an analogous approach, one could use the estimates in the paper to compute the e⁄ect of
severance payments on the expected present discounted value of wages, also at the time the
worker is hired. On the basis of our estimates in Table 5 (columns 1), the wage loss for an
average worker in a small ￿rm (with average tenure 3.5 years) after the reform (b ￿2 = ￿0:011)
amounts to about 3:4 euros per week (313 ￿ 0:011) or approximately 179 euros per year.
We use an annual discount rate of 8%, i.e., a discount factor of ￿ = 0:92. To match an
average tenure of 3.5 years, we use an annual survival probability of ￿ = 0:71. Let W be the
present discounted value of the wage loss due to the reform W(b ￿2j￿;￿) = 179￿
P1
t=0[￿￿]t =
516:1. This implies that around 68:8% (516=750 = 0:688) of the expected ￿ring cost is
translated into lower wages. Notice that a 68.8% o⁄setting e⁄ect is not inconsistent with the
view that severance payments may actually strengthen the bargaining power of (incumbent)
workers: in fact the average hides heterogenous e⁄ects across di⁄erent workers.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
  Small firms  Large firms  Small firms  Large firms 
         
Real weekly wages  297.004  312.041  312.923  331.243 
  (72.688)  (83.89)  (78.545)  (90.367) 
Real weekly wage growth rate  0.049  0.04  0.024  0.029 
  (0.121)  (0.114)  (0.123)  (0.127) 
Employment   9.595  19.478  9.541  19.551 
  (2.956)  (2.805)  (2.958)  (2.83) 
White collar dummy  0.134  0.163  0.133  0.165 
  (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.34)  (0.371) 
Age   35.06  35.514  37.489  37.918 
  (8.598)  (8.525)  (8.675)  (8.623) 
Sector dummies:         
Agriculture  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.005 
  (0.079)  (0.069)  (0.077)  (0.071) 
Gas-water-oil  0.001  0  0.001  0 
  (0.03)  (0)  (0.03)  (0) 
Extraction-minerals-chemical  0.08  0.094  0.077  0.103 
  (0.271)  (0.292)  (0.267)  (0.305) 
Metal  0.272  0.322  0.271  0.311 
  (0.445)  (0.467)  (0.445)  (0.463) 
Manufacturing  0.242  0.297  0.237  0.292 
  (0.429)  (0.457)  (0.425)  (0.455) 
Construction  0.156  0.111  0.163  0.109 
  (0.363)  (0.314)  (0.369)  (0.312) 
Wholesale-retail-hotel  0.182  0.11  0.184  0.118 
  (0.386)  (0.313)  (0.388)  (0.323) 
Transportation  0.032  0.026  0.034  0.026 
  (0.177)  (0.158)  (0.18)  (0.158) 
Banks-insurance  0.011  0.013  0.01  0.014 
  (0.105)  (0.112)  (0.099)  (0.118) 
         
Observations  31505  17121  45848  26178 
Notes: sample of years 1989-1993, all males aged 20-55 hired on a permanent basis in firms of between 5 and 25 em-
ployees.   27 
Table 2: Firm sorting 
  (1)  (2)  (4) 
       
Dummy 13  -0.012  0.014  0.005 
  (0.014)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Dummy 14  -0.026  -0.041  -0.041 
  (0.014)*  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Dummy 15  -0.029  -0.005  -0.001 
  (0.015)*  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Post 1990 × Dummy 13    -0.034  -0.030 
    (0.030)  (0.031) 
Post 1990 × Dummy 14    0.021  0.030 
    (0.033)  (0.034) 
Post 1990 × Dummy 15    -0.031  -0.035 
    (0.033)  (0.033) 
Firms Fixed Effect       0.242 
      (0.033)*** 
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 13       0.348 
      (0.151)** 
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 14       -0.087 
      (0.139) 
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 15       -0.302 
      (0.165)* 
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect       -0.220 
      (0.036)*** 
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 13       -0.254 
      (0.173) 
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 14       0.011 
      (0.162) 
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 15       0.297 
      (0.183) 
Observations  29315  29315  27720 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if in firm j employment at time t is larger than em-
ployment at time t-1, and 0 otherwise. Firms between 5 and 25 workers are included. All specifications include a third 
degree polynomial in lagged firm size, a quadratic in firms' age, sector dummies and year dummies. One asterisk de-
notes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. 
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Table 3: Balanced test of firm characteristics 
























                     
  2
nd degree polynomial 
                     
Post 
1990 ×   -3.760  -0.473  -0.112  -0.001  0.101  -0.699  1.218*  -0.990*  0.823  0.240 
Small 
Firm  (10.816)  (0.515)  (0.131)  (0.028)  (0.441)  (0.733)  (0.737)  (0.535)  (0.620)  (0.251) 
                     
  3
rd degree polynomial 
                     
Post 
1990 ×   -41.268  1.355  0.531  0.002  3.533  1.333  -2.234  -1.770  -1.707  -1.541 
Small 
Firm  (83.991)  (3.996)  (1.014)  (0.216)  (3.420)  (5.691)  (5.721)  (4.155)  (4.816)  (1.952) 
                     
Obs.  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043  28043 
Data collapsed at firm-year level. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; 
three asterisks denotes significance at 1%.   29 
Table 4: Workers' sorting 
Dependent Variable:  mover dummy 
(probit)  P > 15    P £ 15 
           
Small firm dummy  0.009  0.009    -0.000  0.000 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1990  -0.010  -0.010    -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1991  -0.013  -0.013    0.001  0.001 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***    (0.005)  (0.005) 
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1992  -0.014  -0.014    0.024  0.023 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***    (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1993  -0.003  -0.003    0.014  0.014 
  (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
Workers Fixed Effect    -0.010      -0.061 
    (0.012)      (0.014)*** 
Workers Fixed Effect × Small firm 
dummy    0.001      0.022 
    (0.015)      (0.017) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1990    -0.008      -0.012 
    (0.016)      (0.019) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1991    -0.020      -0.001 
    (0.016)      (0.020) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1992    -0.019      0.044 
    (0.017)      (0.021)** 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1993    -0.008      -0.005 
    (0.015)      (0.023) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1990 × Small Firm Dummy    0.008      0.018 
    (0.021)      (0.024) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1991 × Small Firm Dummy    0.050      0.003 
    (0.021)**      (0.024) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1992 × Small Firm Dummy    0.024      -0.033 
    (0.022)      (0.025) 
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 
1993 × Small Firm Dummy    0.016      0.024 
    (0.018)      (0.027) 
Observations  120652  120652    120583  120583 
Notes: In the first (last) two columns the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if worker i moves to a 
firm with more (less) than 15 employees and 0 otherwise. Firms between 5 and 25 employees included. All specifica-
tions include a quadratic in workers' age, year dummies, sector dummies and a polynomial in the size of the firm of 
origin. Standard errors in brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; 
three asterisks denote significance at 1%.   30 
Table 5. Log wage levels 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Panel A: Full sample 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.011  -0.004  -0.002  -0.013  -0.008 
  [0.003]***  [0.002]*  [0.002]  [0.004]***  [0.003]*** 
           
Observations  96333  96333  96333  83592  83592 
R-squared  0.26  0.16  0.22     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
  Panel B: Movers 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.021  -0.019  -0.011  -0.025  -0.024 
  [0.006]***  [0.005]***  [0.005]**  [0.008]***  [0.008]*** 
           
Observations  28451  28451  28451  19074  19074 
R-squared  0.20  0.13  0.17     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.22; 0.00  0.70; 0.00 
  Panel C: Stayers 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.008  0.002  0.001  -0.011  - 
  [0.003]***  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.005]**  - 
           
Observations  67882  67882  67882  64518  - 
R-squared  0.28  0.19  0.24     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  - 
  Panel D: Blue collars 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.014  -0.004  -0.001  -0.015  -0.006 
  [0.003]***  [0.002]*  [0.002]  [0.003]***  [0.003]** 
           
Observations  82413  82413  82413  71526  71526 
R-squared  0.13  0.14  0.09     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
  Panel E: White collars 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  0.005  -0.001  -0.004  0.003  -0.006 
  [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.019]  [0.007] 
           
Observations  13920  13920  13920  12066  12066 
R-squared  0.18  0.20  0.20     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.37; 0.00  0.13; 0.00 
  Panel F: Young (age < 30) 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.019  -0.012  -0.007  -0.024  -0.028 
  [0.005]***  [0.005]**  [0.004]*  [0.007]***  [0.010]*** 
           
Observations  23579  23579  23579  19934  19934 
R-squared  0.17  0.18  0.16     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.02; 0.00 
  Panel G: Old (age > 45) 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.006  -0.001  -0.001  -0.006  0.001 
  [0.007]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.009] 
           
Observations  19784  19784  19784  17337  17337 
R-squared  0.29  0.11  0.22     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
           
Workers FE  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Firms FE  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
IV  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the 
size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy (except in panels D and E). 
One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance 
at 1%.   31 
Table 6. Log wage changes  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Panel A: Full sample 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.013  -0.011  -0.010  -0.016  -0.009 
  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.004]** 
           
Observations  93435  93435  93435  81391  81391 
R-squared  0.01  0.03  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
  Panel B: Movers 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.022  -0.021  -0.017  -0.033  -0.034 
  [0.005]***  [0.006]***  [0.007]**  [0.007]***  [0.013]** 
           
Observations  27322  27322  27322  18251  18251 
R-squared  0.02  0.03  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.33; 0.00  0.52; 0.00 
  Panel C: Stayers 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.009  -0.006  -0.007  -0.012  - 
  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  - 
           
Observations  66113  66113  66113  63140  - 
R-squared  0.02  0.05  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  - 
  Panel D: Blue collars 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.014  -0.012  -0.011  -0.016  -0.009 
  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.004]** 
           
Observations  79967  79967  79967  69662  69662 
R-squared  0.01  0.03  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
  Panel E: White collars 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010  -0.010 
  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.008] 
           
Observations  13468  13468  13468  11729  11729 
R-squared  0.02  0.04  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.30; 0.00  0.09; 0.00 
  Panel F: Young (age < 30) 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.018  -0.021  -0.020  -0.026  -0.029 
  [0.004]***  [0.006]***  [0.005]***  [0.005]***  [0.010]*** 
           
Observations  22028  22028  22028  18717  18717 
R-squared  0.01  0.03  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.01; 0.00  0.03; 0.00 
  Panel G: Old (age > 45) 
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.007  -0.011  -0.009  -0.006  -0.021 
  [0.004]  [0.005]**  [0.005]*  [0.005]  [0.011]* 
           
Observations  19535  19535  19535  17169  17169 
R-squared  0.01  0.07  0.01     
F-test of excluded instr. (p-value)        0.00; 0.00  0.00; 0.00 
           
Workers FE  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Firms FE  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
IV  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the 
size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy (except in panels D and E). 
One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance 
at 1%.   32 
Table 7: Quantile regression: Log of wage drift (firm size 5-25) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  Panel A: full sample 1989-1993 
         
  Q05  Q10  Q50  Q90 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.062  -0.035  -0.021  -0.014 
  [0.012]***  [0.008]***  [0.007]***  [0.007]* 
         
Observations  50207  50207  50207  50207 
         
  Panel B: blue collars 1989-1993 
   
  Q05  Q10  Q50  Q90 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.042  -0.026  -0.018  -0.013 
  [0.008]***  [0.004]***  [0.006]***  [0.015] 
         
Observations  43539  43539  43539  43539 
The wage drift is the difference between the actual wage and the sectoral minimum wage. All specifications include a 
third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar 
dummy. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; 











Table 8: Placebo tests on log wage levels 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Firm Threshold =10  Reform in year 1992   Reform in year 1988 
       
Post 1990 × 10 employees threshold dummy  -0.003     
  [0.002]     
Post 1992 × Small Firm Dummy    0.000   
    [0.000]   
Post 1988 × Small Firm Dummy      0.002 
      [0.002] 
Observations  96333  96458  157513 
R-squared  0.16  0.15  0.30 
Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specifications include workers fixed effects, a third de-
gree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One 
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Table 9: Robustness check: Log wage levels 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  Panel A: different time spans 
         
  1989-93  1988-93  1987-94  1986-96 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.011  -0.006  -0.006  -0.008 
  [0.003]***  [0.003]**  [0.002]***  [0.002]*** 
         
Observations  96333  117630  158116  211267 
R-squared  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.28 
         
  Panel B: different firm-size windows 
   
  5-25  5-20  10-20  10-25 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.011  -0.008  -0.008  -0.012 
  [0.003]***  [0.004]**  [0.004]*  [0.003]*** 
         
Observations  96333  81713  47481  62101 
R-squared  0.26  0.25  0.24  0.25 
Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the 
size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signifi-




Table 10: Local linear regression: Log wage levels (firm size 5-25) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  Panel A: different estimators 
         
  OLS  Worker FE  Firm FE  IV 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.011  -0.004  -0.003  -0.006 
  [0.002]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]*  [0.003]* 
         
Observations  96333  96333  96333  96333 
R-squared 
F-test of excluded instr.  
(p-value) 
0.24  0.88  0.70   
 
0.00; 0.00 
         
  Panel B: OLS different time spans 
   
  1989-93  1988-93  1987-94  1986-96 
         
Post 1990 × Small Firm Dummy  -0.011  -0.007  -0.008  -0.011 
  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]*** 
         
Observations  96333  117630  158116  211267 
R-squared  0.24  0.26  0.27  0.28 
The optimal symmetric bandwidth is chosen with cross-validation methods ∆=10. All specifications include age dum-
mies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in 
brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes sig-
nificance at 1%. 
 
 